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Abstract
We investigate game theoretic models of network formation that are based on
individual actions only. Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic
principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent. (2) Link
formation should be costly. (3) The class of network payoﬀ functions should
be as general as possible.
We provide characterizations of stable networks under the hypothesis of
mutual consent for the case of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.
Furthermore, we introduce a new equilibrium concept based on a limited, realis-
tic form of farsightedness or (myopic) “trust” in network formation. We provide
comparisons of the resulting networks with networks satisfying the well known
stability concepts developed in the literature.
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Networks impact the way we behave, the information we receive, the communities
we are part of, and the opportunities that we pursue. They aﬀect the machinations
of corporations, the benevolence of non-proﬁt organizations, and the workings of the
state. Two recent overviews of the literature on statistical properties of large scale
networks, Watts [32] and Barab´ asi [4], discuss the relevance of networks for ﬁelds as
diverse as physics, sociology, and biology. There has been a similar resurgence of in-
terest in economics to understand the phenomenon of network formation. A number
of recent contributions to the literature have recognized that networks play an impor-
tant role in the generation of economic gains for groups of decision makers. Diﬀerent
network structures usually lead to diﬀerent levels of generated gains and network
relationships between individuals have been interpreted in diﬀerent ways. Among
others, for example, such relationships could represent communication possibilities,
trade relations, or authority relationships between superiors and subordinates.
In this paper we study game-theoretic models of social network formation. Players
in our framework are represented by nodes in the network, and their relationships by
links between nodes. Our approach is based on three simple and realistic principles
that govern most real-world networks: (1) Link formation should be based on a binary
process of consent. (2) Link formation should in principle be costly. (3) The payoﬀ
structure of network formation should be as general as possible.
Consequently, the creation of a link requires the consent of both players involved;
the link between players i and j is only established when player j is willing to accept
the link initiated by player i or vice versa.
Costly link formation is typical in the literature and we consider both one-sided
and two-sided costs of link formation. In the ﬁrst model both consenting players
bear an individually determined cost of link formation, while in the latter model we
distinguish between an “initiator” and a “respondent” in the link formation process.
Under one-sided link formation costs, only the initiator incurs a cost to link formation.
We consider a very general payoﬀ structure that has two components — an ar-
bitrary beneﬁt function and additive link formation costs. Beneﬁts depend on the
resulting network. Costs depend on the strategies chosen by the player in the link
formation process and are incurred independent of the outcome, i.e, even if a link is
1not established the initiating player still has to pay for it.1
The process of network formation studied here is based on the simple network for-
mation model introduced by Myerson [22], page 448. Following Myerson, we model
the link formation process as a normal form non-cooperative game. It incorporates
the fundamental idea that networks are the result of consensual link formation be-
tween pairs of players. The structure of the model takes account the three realistic
features discussed above. We call this (realistic) generalization of Myerson’s model
the standard model of network formation.
In the literature since Myerson, the standard model has been portrayed as being
problematic since it is believed to have “too many” Nash equilibria. (See for example
Jackson [15].) However, until now there has been no attempt to provide a complete
characterization of the set of these Nash equilibria. We ﬁll this void in the literature
by providing such a characterization. Our characterization reveals that the resulting
networks have some appealing properties.
Second, to abandon such a realistic and elegant model because it is not discerning
enough in terms of its permissible equilibria seems hardly justiﬁed. Namely, in this
model links are only established with the consent of both players involved. Hence
costly link formation requires that players must have an implicit trust in each other.
The standard model thereby provides a realistic foundation for studying the role of
trust in network formation. Here, we also enhance the scope of the analysis by en-
dowing the players with a form of sequential rationality based on myopic beliefs about
the other players. This newly introduced equilibrium concept, thus, incorporates a
simple form of farsightedness or “trust” in the process of network formation.
Our model of trust in link formation corresponds well with the literature on rela-
tional trust. A common interpretation of links that applies to much of the networks
literature is the fact that they are best imagined as conﬁrmations of already estab-
lished relationships that occur in a non-modelled process prior to the formulated
game. Insights from research in social networks suggest that this phenomenon can be
described as a form of trust. A large body of literature in sociology has argued that
the process of link formation is not purely random; players establish links with those
they trust. For example, one of the earliest such studies by Wellman, Carrington and
1An arbitrary cost structure would require costs to be dependent on the outcome. The payoﬀ
speciﬁcation then would become game dependent forcing us to give up generality in the results. We
believe that the chosen payoﬀ structure based on arbitrary beneﬁts and additive link formation costs
has the added advantage of capturing what genuinely occurs in a realistic process of link formation.
2Hall [33] involved a survey of residents in East York, Canada, begun in 1968. They
found that in the East Yorker networks, the majority of “intimate” or “strong ties”
were with kin and neighbors and the majority of “routine” or “weak ties” were with
(more distant) acquaintances ([33], Table 6.1, page 143).
This insight is also at the foundation of Granovetter’s [12] theory on the strength
of weak ties. Granovetter argued that the functioning of our society relies mainly on
the presence of suﬃciently many weak ties. Counterintuitively, strong ties can easily
be replaced, since there is a redundancy in relationships among close associates such
as family members. Weak ties, on the other hand, are solitary and as such more
essential in the social network.
The role of trust in the case of strong ties is clearly based on the closeness or
intimacy of the relationship between the two parties creating the link. In fact, trust
is assumed here nearly automatically. For weak ties too, trust plays a central role;
links are mainly established between parties that can trust each other in the sense
that each party is backed by certain other factors such as the party’s reputation, the
party’s socio-economic role, or the party’s position in the established social network.
It can be argued that this latter form of trust derives from the individual’s social
capital. We believe the standard model of network formation involving trust can
provide the basis for exploring the link between social networks and social capital.
Clearly, the trust required for a weak tie is quite distinct from the trust that stems
from intimacy in a strong tie. Yet while trust itself might be manifested in diﬀerent
forms, it has the same eﬀects on the link formation process. Consequently, regardless
of the kind of link under consideration, trust is a key element of the link formation
process.
Our aim is to provide a game theoretic formulation for the generic form of trust
in link formation discussed in the previous paragraph. We do this by endowing the
decision makers with a modiﬁed form of rationality, representing a myopic belief or
“trust” that the other decision makers will respond rationally to their proposals in the
link formation process. Hence, decision makers form beliefs about other individuals
and anticipate their actions. Individual i initiates links with only those individuals
that i thinks will beneﬁt from the links. In doing so the initiating individual assumes
that the respondent will consent to the link and, hence, the incurred link cost will not
be in vain. This form of sequential rationality in network formation is denoted as a
network trust equilibrium. The resulting equilibrium networks are called monadically
3stable.
The ﬁrst part of our paper examines the properties of the standard model of network
formation and characterizes the Nash equilibria of the model. In order to understand
the importance of the ability to break (or deny) links in the process of network
formation we introduce a stability concept called link deletion proofness. Intuitively,
we say a network is link deletion proof when players get a lower payoﬀ by deleting
one of their established links. A variation called strong link deletion proofness allows
players to consider the simultaneous deletion of multiple links. We then examine the
relationship between the classes of networks satisfying the various stability concepts,
and the set of networks resulting from the Nash equilibria of the network formation
game. The latter class is denoted as the set of individually stable networks.
For the model with two-sided link formation costs — where both players have to
pay a cost (not necessarily equal) for establishing the link — we ﬁnd that a network
is individually stable if and only if it is strong link deletion proof. This is easily
explained since links require both players to incur a link formation cost, while Nash
equilibrium permits simultaneous deletion of multiple links. We also introduce a
variation of Jackson and Wolinsky’s [19] notion of pairwise stability called strong
pairwise stability. This is an appealing stability concept since it combines (regular)
pairwise stability with strong link deletion proofness by allowing for the deletion of
multiple links but addition of only one link at a time. We ﬁnd that a strongly pairwise
stable network is individually stable, but the reverse is not true.2 Furthermore, we
provide some comparisons with the class of strongly stable networks introduced by
Jackson and van den Nouweland [17].
Next we study the one-sided cost model where only the link initiating player incurs
a cost. The responding player does not pay for the link but must give her consent to
the link. We ﬁnd that a network that is individually stable under the two-sided cost
model is also individually stable under one-sided costs of link formation. The reverse
does not hold since link formation costs may diﬀer across players. Under one-sided
link formation the player with the lower costs acts as the link initiator resulting in
networks that may not be individually stable under two-sided link formation costs.
2An example shows that the reverse is not valid since Nash equilibrium only allows players to
delete one or more links at a time. All of this indicates that the opportunities available to players
for establishing links play a crucial role in the process of network formation, suggesting that varying
initial conditions can easily lead to social stratiﬁcation.
4Moreover, we ﬁnd that — unlike for the two-sided cost model — only strong link
deletion proof networks are individually stable while the converse does not hold if
link formation costs are one-sided. Further, a simple payoﬀ speciﬁcation is used to
investigate the relationship between potential maximizers and Nash equilibria for the
standard model. We ﬁnd that the potential maximizer is an useful reﬁnement for the
model with one-sided link formation costs, but oddly enough it is not helpful for the
two-sided cost formulation.
Since the standard model of network formation is suﬃciently general it can incor-
porate a number of existing network models thereby ensuring existence of individually
stable networks.3 For Nash equilibria of the two-sided cost model with consent, it
is possible to ﬁnd parallels in the literature on pairwise stability. Here, existence of
stable networks for the two-sided cost model is guaranteed for a large class of games;
see Jackson and Watts [18]. For example, every pairwise stable equilibria in the sym-
metric connections model is strongly pairwise stable. For the one-sided cost model,
similar parallels can be drawn with the Nash network formulation developed by Bala
and Goyal [2]. Recall that the ﬂow of beneﬁts is two-way, while only the initiating
player incurs the cost of the link in the one-sided model. Since consent in the game
is costless, and under the Bala-Goyal type of speciﬁcation always yields positive ben-
eﬁts, the responding player would immediately consent to the link. This implies that
existence is as well guaranteed for a large class of speciﬁcations.
In the second half of our paper we introduce a simple form of trust in the process
of network formation. As discussed above, the notion of network trust equilibrium
diﬀers from Nash equilibrium in that players play a best response to their beliefs about
others, whereas in Nash equilibrium players select a best response to the actions of the
other players. We consider the network trust equilibrium concept and the resulting
monadically stable networks to be a more appropriate solution concept for studying
network formation. Indeed as Granovetter [12] argued, the functioning of the network
relies very much on the presence of suﬃciently many weak ties. We argue that trust
is essential in the formation of these particular links.
Again we consider the two-sided cost model and show that if a network is monadi-
cally stable, it is also strongly pairwise stable. Hence, we ﬁnd that every monadically
stable network is individually and pairwise stable. Examples are used to show that
3As mentioned it is the abundance of individually stable networks and not the absence of equilibria
which is sometimes a source of criticism for network models.
5monadically stable networks may not always exist and that a strongly pairwise stable
network need not be monadically stable. An interesting insight that emerges from
the examples is the fact that there is no relationship between monadic stability and
strong stability. The reason for this is the fact that strong stability allows coalitions
of players to change their strategies and monadic stability while incorporating beliefs
about other players is still an individually based equilibrium concept.
Finally, we show that for one-sided link formation costs, a network trust equi-
librium might not exist due to coordination problems. In other words, coordination
failure may occur because each player expects the other player to establish the link.
To sum up, myopic trust modelled through the network trust equilibrium concept
leads to a class of very sensible and highly plausible networks under two-sided link
formation costs, but may lead to severe coordination problems when considering one-
sided link formation costs.
Related Literature
Our study of trust in network formation is at the junction of both the noncooperative
and cooperative game theoretic models of network formation. The standard model
of network formation discussed here captures most of the basic, realistic elements of
network formation.
This is in contrast to much of the established literature on directed links.4 The
creation of directed links have been addressed by Bala and Goyal [2, 3] and Dutta
and Jackson [6]. The main objective of these contributions has been to describe the
networks that are formed in games where one player can establish a link without the
consent of the other player. The Nash equilibria in the resulting game are called Nash
networks and are characterized in Bala and Goyal [3] for diﬀerent payoﬀ structures.
We argue, however, that such Nash networks are quite inadequate since they do
not cover many situations of interest to economists. First, given the absence of con-
sent, at best, they describe situations of information exchange, perhaps like accessing
a player’s web page. In fact, the problem of relevance is already indicated in the
cited papers. Second, the links generated might also be interpreted as conﬁrmations
of already established relationships created in a non-modelled process prior to the
formulated game. This implies however, that the model is incomplete and should be
4The ﬂow of beneﬁts however may or may not be undirected in the diﬀerent models discussed in
the literature.
6extended to incorporate a ﬁrst stage of link formation. Finally, the links may be inter-
preted as being purely involuntary, i.e., this might be envisioned as ﬁrms linking their
products to those of other ﬁrms by making comparisons in advertisements. However,
the payoﬀ structures investigated by Bala and Goyal [3] do not cover situations of
this type. We believe that our approach addresses the two concerns mentioned above.
The single exception in the Nash networks literature that explicitly accounts for
consent issues is the paper by Haller and Sarangi [13]. It is, however, an exploratory
analysis where the consent model is an extension of the main formulation. They ﬁnd
that costless mutual consent leads to a larger set of equilibria than the model with
no consent. In the variation with link capacity constraints they ﬁnd that agents have
an incentive to form links with similar agents — highly able agents consent to link
with other highly able agents leaving out lowly able agents. The focus of their paper
is on reliability issues and they use speciﬁc payoﬀ formulations.
Slikker et al. [26] also recognize these drawbacks of Nash networks and develop a
diﬀerent approach to modelling the emergence of directed networks. They arrive at
an alternative foundation of hierarchical networks as the only directed networks in
which certain allocation mechanisms can be implemented. This approach, however,
is not developed within the general payoﬀ structures pursued in our paper.
An alternative, link-wise approach to network formation has been introduced by
Jackson and Wolinsky [19]. They developed a link-based equilibrium concept, denoted
as pairwise stability. The main problem with this approach is that it only considers
the formation of a single link without basing its formation on actions selected by the
individual players. Unlike the Nash network models however, it does require both
players to pay for the cost of a link. (For a substantive survey of this literature we
refer to Jackson [15].) Our notion of strong pairwise stability improves on this by
allowing an individual player to delete multiple links. Indeed strong pairwise stability
is a hybrid concept incorporating elements of Nash networks with pairwise stability.
Next we turn to the literature on reduced formulations of the standard model.
For payoﬀs based on cooperative games with transferable utilities, besides Nash
equilibrium, other equilibrium concepts investigated include undominated equilib-
ria, coalition proof equilibria and strong Nash. (See for instance Slikker and van den
Nouweland [29].) One of the ﬁrst papers to use these diﬀerent concepts was Dutta
and Mutuswami [8]. They investigate the tension between stability and eﬃciency
using strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Starting with a given value
7function their goal was to ﬁnd allocation functions with desirable properties that min-
imize the conﬂict between eﬃciency and stability. Slikker and van den Nouweland
[27] introduce link formation costs. Unfortunately, their results do not extend beyond
the four player case.
Another variation of the standard model with TU-based payoﬀs is developed in
Slikker and van den Nouweland [28]. In their model agents announce what links
they want to form as well as the rewards they wish to obtain from the formation of
diﬀerent links. Using the above reﬁnements they ﬁnd that the equilibrium cooperation
structure does not contain any cycles.
A drawback of the models discussed is that they do not consider the standard
model of network formation that we believe is the most realistic and simple descrip-
tion of the process of network formation. One notable exception is Dutta et al. [9],
although their model does not incorporate link formation costs. Another problem
with most of these models based in cooperative game theory is the fact that results
are often obtained by imposing speciﬁc conditions on the payoﬀ function. Our paper
addresses this shortcoming by providing a characterization of costly network forma-
tion with arbitrary payoﬀ functions.
Most of the literature discussed until now, including the present one, consider a
normal-form strategic modelling of the process of network formation. A number of
papers however, have also scrutinized network formation as a sequential game. We
discuss the most pertinent ones. The seminal paper by Aumann and Myerson [1]
considers a two-stage game, where the ﬁrst stage concerns link creation which is
interpreted as the framework for payoﬀ negotiations in the next stage. In the second
stage the Myerson value is used to determine the payoﬀs of individual players in
the cooperation structure established in stage one. While this approach leads to the
endogenous formation of cooperation structures, it does not permit link deletion in
the network. However, unlike most of the other sequential models they consider non-
myopic players and ﬁnd that ineﬃcient networks may result, setting the stage for
the stability-eﬃciency debate. Another interesting ﬁnding is the fact that the grand
coalition need not emerge in equilibrium.
As mentioned earlier Slikker and van den Nouweland [28] consider a one stage
version of this game where the payoﬀ division depends on the links the players are
willing to form and not on a pre-assigned imputation. Currarini and Morelli [5] is a
natural extension of the Slikker and van den Nouweland [28] paper to a sequential
8structure. Note that unlike Aumann and Myerson [1], here the distribution of payoﬀs
is endogenous. Again, they ﬁnd that if the value function has the property that each
additional link increases the value, i.e., network formation satisﬁes link monotonicity,
then every equilibrium network is eﬃcient. The criticisms mentioned above also apply
to both these papers.
Finally, Watts [31] considers network formation in a dynamic framework where
myopic self interested individuals can form and sever links. She ﬁnds that ineﬃciency
persists in network formation and points towards the modelling of forward looking
behavior as a possible solution to this problem. The notion of trust introduced in
this paper is a step in this direction, since agents play a best response to their beliefs
about others. This is of course a very simple form of non-myopic behavior since player
i’s beliefs about k are not inﬂuenced by j’s beliefs about k.
It is clear that other formulations are possible as well, and that higher levels of
rationality can be modelled through higher stage forms of such trust. For a short
discussion of these other possibilities we also refer to Jackson [15]. A recent paper
by Page et al. [24] considers farsighted behavior by coalitions. In a certain sense this
approach is complementary to the one in Jackson and van den Nouweland [17]. Unlike
our paper, it is coalitions of players rather than individual players that transform
one network to another. Consequently, coalitions form the unit of analysis and are
endowed with ability for farsighted behavior. Recall that in our formulation agents
have very naive beliefs about other players. Full rationality however can be formulated
through an inﬁnite process of reasoning about the anticipated behavior of the other
players.5 The study of such advanced models incorporating trust is developed further
in, for example, Gilles and Sarangi [11].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper provides
the model setup. In section 3 we study individual stability of networks and section
4 is about monadic stability. Section 5 has concluding remarks, while several proofs
have been relegated to Section 6.
5For an interesting paper that explores the relationship between common knowledge and incom-
plete information in the context of networks we refer to McBride [20].
92 Preliminaries and notation
In this section we introduce the basic concepts and notation pertaining to non-
cooperative games and networks.
2.1 Non-cooperative games
A non-cooperative game on the ﬁxed, ﬁnite player set N = {1,...,n} is given
by a list (Ai,πi)i∈N where for every player i ∈ N, Ai denotes an action set and
πi: A → R denotes player i’s payoﬀ function. An individual action of player i ∈ N
is denoted by ai ∈ Ai and an action tuple is written as a = (a1,...,an) ∈ A =
A1 × ··· × An. For every action tuple a ∈ A and player i ∈ N, we denote by
a−i = (a1,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,an) ∈ A−i =
Q
j6=i Aj the actions selected by the players
other than i. In the rest of the paper we will denote a non-cooperative game on N
for short by the pair (A,π), where π = (π1,...,πn): A → RN is the composite payoﬀ
function. A non-cooperative game (A,π) is called ﬁnite if for every i ∈ N the action
set Ai is ﬁnite.
An action ai ∈ Ai for player i ∈ N is called a best response to a−i ∈ A−i if for
every action bi ∈ Ai we have that πi(ai,a−i) = πi(bi,a−i). A best response ai to a−i
is strict if for every bi 6= ai we have that πi(ai,a−i) > πi(bi,a−i). An action tuple
ˆ a ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A,π) if for every player i ∈ N
πi(ˆ a) = πi(bi,ˆ a−i) for every action bi ∈ Ai.
Hence, a Nash equilibrium ˆ a ∈ A satisﬁes the property that for every player i ∈ N
the action ˆ ai is a best response to ˆ a−i. A Nash equilibrium ˆ a ∈ A is called strict if
for every player i ∈ N the action ˆ ai is a strict best response to ˆ a−i.
A function Q: A → R is a potential of the non-cooperative game (A,π) on the player
set N if for every player i ∈ N, action tuple a ∈ A and action bi ∈ Ai:
πi(a) − πi(bi,a−i) = Q(a) − Q(bi,a−i).
The notion of a potential game was introduced by Monderer and Shapley [21] based
on the seminal work of Hart and Mas-Colell [14]. They also introduced the notion
of a potential maximizer being an action tuple a ∈ A such that Q(a) = Q(b) for
every b ∈ A. The set of potential maximizers will be indicated by PM(A,π) ⊂ A.
10It is obvious that each potential maximizer is a Nash equilibrium and, hence, this
notion is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept. Monderer and Shapley [21]
also show that PM(A,π) 6= ∅ for every ﬁnite potential game (A,π) on N.
An alternative description of a potential game has been introduced by Ui [30] as
follows. A coalition is any subset of players S ⊂ N and for a coalition S we denote
by AS =
Q
i∈S Ai its restricted action tuple set. A set of functions {ΦS: AS → R |
S ⊂ N} is an interaction potential of the game (A,π) if for every i ∈ N and every





Ui showed that potentials and interaction potentials are essentially the same:
Lemma 2.1 (Ui [30], Theorem 3) The game (A,π) has a potential Q: A → R if
and only if (A,π) possesses an interaction potential {ΦS | S ⊂ N}. Furthermore, for
the latter case a potential Q of the game (A,π) is given by Q(a) =
P
S⊂N ΦS(aS).
We will use these insights to analyze properties of certain behavioral models of net-
work formation.
2.2 Networks
In our discussion of the foundations of the theory of networks we use established
notation from Jackson and Wolinsky [19], Dutta and Jackson [7], and Jackson [15].
The reader may refer to these sources for a more elaborated discussion.
We limit our discussion to non-directed networks on the player set N. In these
networks the two players making up a single link are essentially equal. Formally, if
two players i,j ∈ N with i 6= j are related we say that there exists a link between
players i and j. We use the notation ij to describe the binary link {i,j}.6 We deﬁne
gN = {ij | i,j ∈ N, i 6= j} as the set of all potential links. A network g on N is
now introduced as any set of links g ⊂ gN. Note that g = gN is called the complete
network and g = g0 = ∅ is known as the empty network.
The set of (direct) neighbors of a player i ∈ N in the network g is given by
N
d(i,g) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g} ⊂ N.
6We reiterate that network relationships are non-directed, i.e., in this context ij = ji. However,
in regard to the costs of establishing a link one may distinguish between the costs related to ij and
the costs related to ji, i.e., possibly it holds that for cost levels cij 6= cji.
11For every pair of players i,j ∈ N with i 6= j we denote by g+ij = g∪{ij} the network
that results from adding the link ij to the network g. Similarly, g − ij = g \ {ij}
denotes the network resulting from removing the link ij from network g.
More generally we say that network g0 is obtainable from network g through coali-
tion S ⊂ N if
(i) ij ∈ g0 and ij 6∈ g implies that {i,j} ⊂ S, and
(ii) ij ∈ g and ij 6∈ g0 implies that {i,j} ∩ S 6= ∅.
The notion of obtainability has been introduced in Jackson and van den Nouweland
[17]. It stipulates that deleting links requires that only one of the constituting players
is in the coalition S while creating links requires that both constituting players are
members of S. This reﬂects that a player can unilaterally sever links, but the creation
of new links involves the consent of the other players involved.
Within a network, beneﬁts for the players are generated depending on how they
are connected to each other. This is represented by a “network payoﬀ function” for
every player.7 For player i ∈ N the function ϕi: {g | g ⊂ gN} → R denotes her
network payoﬀ function which assigns to every network g ⊂ gN a value ϕi(g) that
is obtained by player i when she participates in network g. The composite network
payoﬀ function is now given by ϕ = (ϕ1,...,ϕn): {g | g ⊂ gN} → RN. We emphasize
that these payoﬀs can be zero, positive, or negative and that the empty network
g0 = ∅ generates (reservation) values ϕ(g0) ∈ RN that might be non-zero as well.
Several examples of standard network payoﬀ functions are reviewed in Jackson
[15, 16]. In van den Nouweland [23], Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs [9], Slikker
[25], Slikker and van den Nouweland [27], and Garratt and Qin [10] these network
payoﬀ functions are based on underlying cooperative games.
Here we study network formation using arbitrary (network) payoﬀ functions that
do not rely on speciﬁc payoﬀ structures such as those used in cooperative games
satisfying certain properties or even explicit formulations like those used in Nash
7In the literature there has been a discussion regarding the appropriate terminology for describing
values or payoﬀs generated in networks. In this paper we use the notion of a “payoﬀ function” to
describe individual utilities in non-cooperative games, and a “network payoﬀ function” to denote
individual values generated in the context of a network. In the literature this latter concept is also
described as “value function”, tying it to the “values” literature in cooperative game theory where
a substantial part of the networks literature originated.
12networks. We will also use the following example throughout the paper to illustrate
many interesting properties. It uses the simplest possible link-wise payoﬀ generation.
Example 2.2 (Link-based payoﬀs)
Let N = {1,...,n} be an arbitrary set of players. First, let φ: gN → R+ be a
link beneﬁt function. It assigns to every potential link ij ∈ gN a payoﬀ φ(ij) = 0.
Next we deﬁne the network payoﬀ function e ϕi: {g | g ⊂ gN} → R+ with e ϕi(g) =
P
j∈Nd(i,g) φ(ij), where φ is the link beneﬁt function. The resulting network payoﬀ
function e ϕ is called a link-based network payoﬀ function.
We investigate the properties of this link-based network payoﬀ structure to illustrate
the relationships between the diﬀerent concepts. The link-based payoﬀ structure in
this application reﬂects in particular the beneﬁts obtained from having links with
direct neighbors. Interestingly this simple payoﬀ structure is shown to have some
remarkable properties. 
We conclude the preliminaries on network theory with the deﬁnition and discussion
of several stability conditions. Note that the stability notions introduced below are
based on the properties of the network itself rather than strategic considerations of
the players. This latter viewpoint is also advocated by Jackson [15].
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let ϕ be a network payoﬀ function on the player set N.
(a) A network g ⊂ gN is link deletion proof if for every player i ∈ N and every
j ∈ Nd(i,g) it holds that ϕi(g − ij) 5 ϕi(g).
(b) A network g ⊂ gN is strong link deletion proof if for every player i ∈ N
and every M ⊂ Nd(i,g) it holds that ϕi(g \ hM) 5 ϕi(g), where hM = {ij ∈
g | j ∈ M} ⊂ g.
(c) A network g ⊂ gN is pairwise stable if g is link deletion proof and, moreover,
for all players i,j ∈ N: ϕi(g + ij) > ϕi(g) implies ϕj(g + ij) < ϕj(g).
(d) A network g ⊂ gN is strongly pairwise stable if g is strong link deletion
proof and, moreover, for all players i,j ∈ N: ϕi(g + ij) > ϕi(g) implies
ϕj(g + ij) < ϕj(g).
(e) A network g ⊂ gN is strongly stable if for any coalition S ⊂ N and any
network g0 that is obtainable from g through S it holds that for every i ∈ S
with ϕi(g0) > ϕi(g) there exists a player j ∈ S such that ϕj(g0) < ϕj(g).
13The two link deletion proofness notions are based on the severance of links in a
network by individual players. In particular, the notion of link deletion proofness
considers the stability of a network with regard to the deletion of a single link.
Strong deletion proofness considers that a player deletes any subset of her existing
links. Clearly, strong link deletion proofness implies link deletion proofness.
Closely related to link deletion proofness is the concept of pairwise stability intro-
duced by Jackson and Wolinsky [19]. Besides the deletion of a single link, it considers
the addition of a single link. The latter only occurs when it is mutually proﬁtable for
both link-constituting individuals.
The notion of strong pairwise stability combines strong link deletion proofness
with pairwise stability. Strong pairwise stability, thus, considers the incentives related
to the removal of multiple links by an individual in combination with the addition
of a single link. The appeal of this stability concept for network formation lies in its
realism: Players consider the creation of one link at time (based on mutual consent)
while they can unilaterally delete one or more of their existing links.
Finally, strong stability allows for arbitrary deviations from a network through
arbitrary deletion and creation of links. It is therefore not tied to the considerations of
a single individual. As Jackson [16] remarks, this concept leads to very well-behaved
networks, but is a very strong requirement. Very few networks satisfy this property.
Example 2.4 We conclude our discussion with an example which delineates the dif-
ferent link-wise stability concepts. Consider the network payoﬀs given in the following
table:
Network ϕ1(g) ϕ2(g) ϕ3(g) Stability
g0 = ∅ 2 2 4 Ds
g1 = {12} 6 4 2 Ps
g2 = {13} 2 2 2
g3 = {23} 0 3 0
g4 = {12,13} 1 1 1
g5 = {12,23} 2 6 2
g6 = {13,23} 5 5 3 P
g7 = gN 7 4 4 S
In the table Ds stands for strong deletion proofness, P for pairwise stability, Ps for
strong pairwise stability, and S for strong stability. Network g6 is neither strongly
14stable nor strongly pairwise stable because player 3 can sever both her ties and move
to network g0. Finally, there are two pairwise stable equilibria, g1 where player 1 is
better oﬀ and g2 where players 2 and 3 are better oﬀ. 
3 Individual stability of networks
In this section we present two game-theoretic models of costly network formation.
Let N = {1,...,n} be a given set of players and ϕ: {g | g ⊂ gN} → RN be a ﬁxed,
but arbitrary network payoﬀ function representing the gross beneﬁts that accrue to
the players in a network. For every player i ∈ N we introduce individualized link
formation costs represented by ci = (cij)j6=i ∈ R
N\{i}
+ . (Recall that for some links
ij ∈ gN it might hold that cij 6= cji.) Thus, the pair hϕ,ci represents the basic
beneﬁts and costs of network formation to the individuals in N. Finally, in a non-
cooperative game theoretic model of network formation (A,π), we say that a network
ˆ g ⊂ gN individually stable if ˆ g can be supported through a Nash equilibrium of (A,π).
A simple, fundamental model of network formation has been introduced by My-
erson [22], page 448, and is based on the idea that pairs of players approach each
other on equal footing and both have to consent to form a link. Myerson [22] based
the beneﬁts from network formation on an underlying cooperative game.8 Here we
extend this framework further to incorporate costs of link formation for arbitrary
network payoﬀ functions. We model link formation costs in two ways: Costs can be
two-sided, i.e., both players incur costs while approaching each other to form a link,
or costs can be one-sided. In the latter case costs are only incurred by the initiating
player, not the responding player.
3.1 Two-sided link formation costs
We ﬁrst address the formalization of the standard model with two-sided link formation
costs. For every player i ∈ N we introduce an action set
A
a
i = {(`ij)j6=i | `ij ∈ {0,1}} (1)
8This cooperative beneﬁts model has been extended by Slikker and van den Nouweland [27] and
Garratt and Qin [10] to incorporate link formation costs. Their formulation only allowed them to
develop a complete and exhaustive description of the resulting networks for situations with up to
four individuals.
15Player i seeks contact with player j if `ij = 1. A link is formed if both players seek




i where ` ∈ Aa. Then the resulting network is given by
g
a(`) = {ij ∈ gN | `ij = `ji = 1}. (2)
Link formation is costly. Approaching player j to form a link costs player i an amount
cij = 0. This results in the following net payoﬀ function for player i:
π
a




`ij · cij (3)
where c is the link formation cost introduced at the beginning of this section.
The pair hϕ,ci thus generates the non-cooperative game (Aa,πa) as described
above. We call this non-cooperative game the standard model of network formation
with two-sided link formation costs.
Theorem 3.1 Let ϕ and c = 0 be given as above. A network g ⊂ gN is individually
stable in the standard model with two-sided link formation costs if and only if g is
strong link deletion proof for the net payoﬀ function ϕa given by
ϕ
a




For a proof of this result we refer to Section 6.
Theorem 3.1 gives a complete characterization of the individually stable networks
in the standard model with two-sided costs of link formation. Note that regardless
of the cost structure, the empty network is always individually stable. The next
corollary strengthens this insight by showing that the empty network is actually
“strictly” individually stable for positive costs.
Corollary 3.2 If c  0, then the empty network is supported by a strict Nash equi-
librium of the standard model with two-sided link formation costs based on the net
payoﬀ function ϕa given in Theorem 3.1.
Proof. First, for every i ∈ N and ` ∈ Aa we deﬁne hi(`) = {ij ∈ gN | `ij =
1 and `ji = 0}. We now show that `∅ is a strict Nash equilibrium in the game
16(Aa,πa), where `∅
ij = 0 for all players i,j ∈ N with i 6= j. Now, for every player

























6= ∅. Hence, we may conclude that indeed `∅ is a strict Nash equilib-
rium in the link formation game (Aa,πa).
From Corollary 3.2 it should be clear that if players start from the empty network
and link formation costs are positive, then there is no reason to form any links.
Dutta et al. [9] showed that in the cooperative beneﬁts model under costless
link formation, every network is individually stable if the network payoﬀ function is
“link monotonic”. Theorem 3.1 generalizes this insight for situations with arbitrary
network payoﬀ functions. This is stated in the next corollary whose proof is immediate
from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.3 Assume that ϕ is link monotonic in the sense that ϕi(g) < ϕi(g+ij)
for all networks g and players i ∈ N with ij 6∈ g where j 6= i. If c = 0, then every
network is individually stable.
A third immediate and important consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that it allows us to
link the notion of strong pairwise stability to individual stability under two-sided link
formation costs. Namely, strong pairwise stability implies strong deletion proofness
and, thus by Theorem 3.1, individual stability of that network. This is summarized
as follows.
Corollary 3.4 Any strongly pairwise stable network with regard to the (net) payoﬀ
function ϕa is individually stable under two-sided link formation costs.
The reverse of Corollary 3.4 however does not hold as is demonstrated in Example
4.4. This example shows that it is possible to have individually stable networks that
are not (strongly) pairwise stable, since pairwise stability allows pairs to establish
links while individual stability only takes individual decisions into account.
Next we turn to examples of network payoﬀ functions that generate standard models
with two-sided link formation costs with some illustrative properties.
17Example 3.5 Consider a link-based network payoﬀ function e ϕ based on the link
beneﬁt function φ: gN → R+ introduced in Example 2.2. Let c = 0 be the link
formation cost parameter. For this network payoﬀ function the individually stable
networks with two-sided link formation costs are given by g ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) =
max{cij,cji}}. In other words individually stable networks consist of links of which
the formation costs are covered by their direct beneﬁts. 
The properties of the link-based network payoﬀ functions also include a relationship
with potential games. This is the subject of our next proposition.
Proposition 3.6 If e ϕi(g) =
P
j∈Nd(i,g) φ(ij) is a link-based network payoﬀ function
founded on the link beneﬁt function φ: gN → R+, then the standard model with
two-sided link formation costs is a potential game. Furthermore, in this game the
potential maximizing individually stable networks are given by g = b gφ ∪ h, where
b gφ = {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) > cij + cji} and h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) = cij + cji}.
Proof. We proceed by constructing an appropriate interaction potential for the
standard model with two-sided link formation costs. By application of Lemma 2.1 it
then is established that this model has a potential.







j6=i `ij · cij if S = {i}
`ij · `ji · φ(ij) if S = {i,j}
0 otherwise
Observe that this is indeed an interaction potential. The function Φ{i}(`i) depends
only on the variables `i. The other parts of the deﬁnition above are easily checked as






(φ(ij) − cij) −
X
j6∈Nd(i,ga(`))




`ij · `ji · φ(ij) −
X
j6=i















[φ(ij) − cij − cji] −
X
ij/ ∈ga(`)
[`ij · cij + `ji · cji].
18From this it is clear that Q is maximal if ga(`) = b gφ ∪ h with h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) =
cij + cji}.
From Proposition 3.6 and the previous discussion of Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2,
we can draw some important conclusions.
First, in game theory the set of potential maximizers is usually considered to be
an important and useful reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept. Proposition 3.6,
however, shows that for two-sided link formation costs, the set of potential maximizing
networks may not the most interesting class of networks. For link-based network
payoﬀs, the largest individually stable network is given by g?
φ = {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) >
max{cij,cji}}. The class of networks identiﬁed in Proposition 3.6 does not contain
this network, and, in fact, does not have any signiﬁcantly distinguishing features. It
is clear that we have to resort to other modiﬁcations of the Nash equilibrium concept
in our study of the formation of non-trivial stable networks.
Second, Monderer and Shapley [21] introduced the notion of an “improvement
path” to describe an individually myopic improvement process that results in a Nash
equilibrium for a potential game. In the context of the model addressed in Proposition
3.6 such processes are less useful. In particular, starting from the empty network — as
the most natural starting point — these improvement paths terminate immediately,
thus, rendering the discussion rather pointless. It is apparent that other behavioral
rules besides individually myopic behavior have to be introduced in the analysis to
support the formation of non-trivial stable networks. Nevertheless, we remark that
individual stability of a network remains a basic requirement for the outcome of any
game theoretic network formation process.
3.2 One-sided link formation costs
Next we address the formalization of the standard model with one-sided link for-
mation costs. Here links are formed by mutual agreement, but one player initiates
the formation process and the other player responds to it. The initiator incurs the
formation costs of the link, while the respondent incurs no costs.9 Formally, for every
9We remark that a similar link formation structure has been already discussed by Slikker et
al. [26] and Slikker [25] in the context of the discussion of the formation of directed networks. See
also Dutta and Jackson [6].
19player i ∈ N we introduce an action set
A
b
i = {(`ij,rij)j6=i | `ij,rij ∈ {0,1}}. (4)
Player i acts as the initiator in forming a link with player j if `ij = 1. Player j
responds positively to this initiative if rji = 1. A link is established if formation is




i. Given the link formation procedure described, for any (`,r) ∈
Ab, the resulting network is now given by
g
b(`,r) = {ij ∈ gN | `ij = rji = 1}. (5)
When player i initiates the formation of a link with player j she incurs a cost of
cij = 0. Responding to the initiative by another player however, is costless. This







`ij · cij (6)
where c denotes the link formation costs.
Analogous to the previous model with two-sided link formation costs, the pair
hϕ,ci generates the non-cooperative game (Ab,πb) introduced above. This game
represents the standard model with one-sided link formation costs. We now illustrate
the deﬁned notions by returning to the case of link-based network payoﬀs.
Example 3.7 Consider a link-based network payoﬀ function e ϕ based on the link
beneﬁt function φ: gN → R+ introduced in Examples 2.2 and 3.5. Also, let c = 0 be
a link formation cost structure.
For this network payoﬀ function the individually stable networks with one-sided link
formation costs are given by g ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) = min{cij,cji}}. From this it
follows immediately that with link-based network payoﬀs the class of individually
stable networks under two-sided link formation costs is usually a strict subset of the
class of individually stable networks under one-sided link formation costs. 
The next result generalizes the insight of Example 3.7. For a proof of the theorem
refer to Section 6 of the paper.
Theorem 3.8 Let ϕ and c = 0 be given. Any individually stable network through
the standard model with two-sided link formation costs is individually stable through
the standard model with one-sided link formation costs.
20Example 3.7 shows that the assertion stated in Theorem 3.8 cannot be reversed. In
Theorem 3.1 we characterized the class of individually stable networks under two-
sided link formation costs. However, such a complete characterization is not possible
with one-sided link formation costs. As usual, a proof of this theorem is contained in
Section 6.
Theorem 3.9 Let ϕ be arbitrary and let c = 0 be such that cij 6= cji for all potential
links ij ∈ gN. If a network g ⊂ gN is strong link deletion proof for the net payoﬀ
function ϕb given by
ϕ
b




then g is individually stable through the standard model with one-sided link formation
costs.
The next example demonstrates that Theorem 3.9 cannot be reversed.
Example 3.10 Consider N = {1,2}. There are only two feasible networks on this
set of players, namely g∅ = ∅ and g = {12} = gN. Consider ϕ1(g0) = ϕ2(g0) = 0,
ϕ1(g) = 1
2, and ϕ2(g) = 10. Finally, we let c12 = 1 < c21 = 2. A Nash equilibrium
for the standard model with one-sided link formation costs is given by `12 = 0,
r12 = 1, `21 = 1, and r21 = 0. Indeed, gb(`,r) = g, πb
1(`,r) = 1
2 > 0 = ϕ1(g0), and
πb
2(`,r) = 8 > 0 = ϕ2(g0). However, ϕb
1(g) = −1
2 < ϕb
1(g0), which implies that g is
not link deletion proof with respect to ϕb for player 1. 
Next we return to the example of link-based network payoﬀs. In Proposition 3.6
we discussed the class of potential maximizing networks for two-sided link formation
costs. Here we present an analogue of that case for one-sided link formation costs.
Proposition 3.11 If e ϕi(g) =
P
j∈Nd(i,g) φ(ij) is a link-based network payoﬀ function
founded on φ: gN → R+, then the standard model with one-sided link formation costs
is a potential game. Moreover, in this case the potential maximizing individually
stable networks are given by g = e gφ ∪ h, where e gφ = {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) > min{cij,cji}}
and h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) = min{cij,cji}}.
Proof. Again we proceed by constructing an appropriate interaction potential. By
application of Lemma 2.1 it is then established that this model has a potential.








j∈Nd(i,g) `ij · cij if S = {i}
mij(`,r) · φ(ij) if S = {i,j}
0 otherwise,
where mij(`,r) = max{`ij · rji,rij · `ji}. It is obvious that this deﬁnes an interaction










mij(`,r) · φ(ij) −
X
j∈Nd(i,g)








Using Lemma 2.1, a potential of the standard model with one-sided link formation










[`ij · cij + `ji · cji].
From this it is clear that Q is maximal if ga(`) = e gφ ∪ h with h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) =
min{cij,cji}}.
Compared to the conclusion in Proposition 3.6 the assertion of Proposition 3.11 is
much more interesting. It identiﬁes exactly the class of networks that result from
the formation of each proﬁtable link, i.e., when link formation is proﬁtable for the
individual with the lowest link costs, the link is always formed. Hence, we conclude
that the reﬁnement of potential maximizer is a much more useful tool in explaining
the formation of non-trivial networks in the context of one-sided link formation costs.
4 Modelling trust: Monadic stability
Let hϕ,ci be given. In the previous section it has been shown that behavior of players
represented by individual stability and the underlying Nash equilibrium of the game
theoretic models (Aa,πa) and (Ab,πb), leaves a lot to be desired in terms of realism
22for explaining the formation of non-trivial networks. The Nash equilibrium concept
does not take account of any cooperative elements such as trust in the process of link
formation.
In this section we discuss an alternative equilibrium concept for these speciﬁc
network formation models that introduces the concept of “trust” into link formation.
This alternative equilibrium concept, called monadic stability, incorporates a rather
modest form of trust into the behavioral principles governing individual decision
making. Players are assumed to take into account that other players are likely to
respond aﬃrmatively to a proposal to form a link if the addition of this link is
proﬁtable for them. Since further consequences are not taken into account, this
modiﬁcation of behavior underlying the Nash equilibrium concept introduces a myopic
element of farsightedness. This limited form of farsightedness thus represents a simple
form of trust that other players will do the “correct” thing when asked whether to
form a link or not.
We discuss the case of two-sided link formation costs separately from the case of
one-sided link formation costs.
4.1 Two-sided link formation costs
Formally, consider the standard model with two-sided link formation costs (Aa,πa).
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let ` ∈ Aa be an arbitrary action tuple. For every player i ∈ N we
deﬁne his myopic belief system `i? ∈ Aa based on ` by
(i) for every j 6= i we let
• `i?
ji = 0 if ϕj(g(`) + ij) − cji < ϕj(g(`)) and
• `i?
ji = 1 if ϕj(g(`) + ij) − cji = ϕj(g(`)),
(ii) and for all j,k ∈ N with j 6= i and k 6= i we deﬁne `i?
jk = `jk.
An action tuple ˆ ` ∈ Aa is a Network Trust Equilibrium under two-sided link
formation costs if for every player i ∈ N: ˆ `i ∈ Aa
i is a best response to ˆ `i?
−i ∈ Aa
−i
for the payoﬀ function πa.
In a Network Trust Equilibrium (NTE) player i anticipates — as captured by her
belief system — that other players will respond “correctly” to her if i approaches
23them to form a link. Hence, a player will agree to form a link with i when it is
myopically proﬁtable to form this link. Similarly, unproﬁtable links initiated by i
will be turned down. In this sense an NTE indeed incorporates a one-stage form of
farsightedness into the behavior of a player. (See also the discussion in Section 1.1.)
A network g on N is now called monadically stable under two-sided link formation
costs if there exists a Network Trust Equilibrium ˆ ` in (Aa,πa) such that g = ga(ˆ `).
The following result gives a (partial) characterization of monadically stable networks
under two-sided link formation costs. For a proof we again refer to Section 6.
Theorem 4.2 Let hϕ,ci be given. Every network g that is monadically stable under
two-sided link formation costs, is strongly pairwise stable for the (net) payoﬀ function
ϕa given in Theorem 3.1.
Combining Theorem 4.2 with Corollary 3.4 we arrive at the following:
Corollary 4.3 Every monadically stable network under two-sided link formation costs
is individually stable under two-sided link formation costs as well as pairwise stable
for the (net) payoﬀ function ϕa.
Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.3 provide an overview of the properties satisﬁed by
monadically stable networks. It is clear that these properties are desirable.
The stated results however do not address the issue of existence of monadically
stable networks under two-sided link formation costs. Although individually stable
networks are plentiful — as shown by Corollary 3.2 — and pairwise stable networks
exist in many situations, this cannot be claimed for monadically stable networks. The
next example provides a simple case in which such networks do not exist.
Example 4.4 In this example we show that under two-sided link formation costs
monadically stable networks may not exist for certain network payoﬀ functions.
Consider three players N = {1,2,3} and assume that cij = 0 for all ij ∈ gN, i.e.,
there is costless link formation. Let the network payoﬀ function ϕ be given by the
table below. This table identiﬁes whether the network in question is individually
stable or strongly pairwise stable, respectively indicated by I and Ps.
24Network ϕ1(g) ϕ2(g) ϕ3(g) Stability
g0 = ∅ 2 2 2 I
g1 = {12} 3 3 0 I
g2 = {13} 5 2 3 I
g3 = {23} 2 3 5 Ps
g4 = {12,13} 4 1 3
g5 = {12,23} 1 4 3
g6 = {13,23} 1 3 6
g7 = gN 3 0 0
The network payoﬀ function given in this table has no monadically stable network. In
fact by Theorem 4.2 there is only one candidate, namely the unique strongly pairwise
stable network g3.10 However, in g3 both players 2 and 3 have direct incentives to
agree to forming a link with player 1, i.e., `1?
21 = `1?
31 = 1. The best reply of player
1 to `1? is to play `12 = `13 = 1 and deviate to network g7. Thus, as a consequence
network g3 is not monadically stable. 
Example 4.4 also shows that the reverse of Theorem 4.2 does not hold. Namely, in
the example we identiﬁed a strongly pairwise stable network that is not monadically
stable under two-sided link formation costs. The intuition for this is quite simple.
Under monadic stability, in equilibrium, every pair of players correctly anticipates
the response of their partner. Hence initiated links are always accepted and links
that will not be accepted are never initiated in equilibrium. This pairwise nature of
beliefs regarding link formation makes monadically stable networks strongly pairwise
stable. On the other hand a network like g3 in the above example is strongly pairwise
stable but not monadically stable since players 2 and 3 do not form beliefs about
each other’s actions when considering links to player 1. Higher order belief systems
are necessary to capture this type of reasoning. This is investigated further in Gilles
and Sarangi [11].
The next example provides an insight on the existence of monadically stable net-
works. It is shown that these networks can co-exist with strongly pairwise stable
networks that are not monadically stable.
Example 4.5 Again consider three players N = {1,2,3} and assume that cij = 0
for all ij ∈ gN. Let the network payoﬀ function ϕ be given by the table below. In this
10That g3 is strongly pairwise stable is obvious because player 1 has no incentive to form links
with either players 2 or 3.
25table, individual stability is indicated with I, pairwise stability by P, strong pairwise
stability by Ps, monadic stability by M, and strong stability by S.11
Network ϕ1(g) ϕ2(g) ϕ3(g) Stability
g0 = ∅ 3 2 2 Ps
g1 = {12} 2 3 2
g2 = {13} 2 2 3
g3 = {23} 1 3 1
g4 = {12,13} 4 1 1
g5 = {12,23} 5 5 5 S, M
g6 = {13,23} 4 4 4 M
g7 = gN 0 0 0
This particular network payoﬀ function shows that diﬀerent classes of stable networks
might emerge. Observe that g0 is strongly pairwise stable, but not monadically stable.
Indeed, in network g0 we have that `1?
21 = `1?
31 = 1 since both player 2 and 3 want to
deviate proﬁtably to g1, respectively g2. Now player 1 has a best response to `1? by
creating links with both 2 and 3, arriving at network g4. Note that g5 is eﬃcient,
strongly stable as well as monadically stable. Finally, g6 is monadically stable, but
not strongly stable since the grand coalition consisting of all players in N would want
to deviate to g5. 
The above example shows that monadically stable networks can be strongly stable
as well. Our ﬁnal example explores the relationship between monadic stability and
strong stability in greater detail. One would expect that strong stability implies
monadic stability, but this is not the case. In fact it turns out that these concepts
can be mutually exclusive due to the fact that strong stability does not account for
beliefs, while monadic stability incorporates the expectations of the two partners
making up a pair considering the formation of link between them.
Example 4.6 Again consider three players N = {1,2,3} and assume that cij = 0
for all ij ∈ gN. Let the network payoﬀ function ϕ be given by the table below.
11Here we recall that Ps implies I as well as P. Indeed, this follows from Corollary 3.4. Moreover,
from Theorem 4.2 we recall that M in turn implies Ps.
26Network ϕ1(g) ϕ2(g) ϕ3(g) Stability
g0 = ∅ 0 0 0
g1 = {12} 0 0 0
g2 = {13} 0 0 0
g3 = {23} 1 1 1 S, not M
g4 = {12,13} 0 0 0 M, not S
g5 = {12,23} 0 2 0
g6 = {13,23} 0 0 2
g7 = gN 2 0 0 M, not S
In this case network g3 is strongly stable, but not monadically stable. Indeed any
coalition of players that deviates contains at least one member for whom the value
reduces from 1 to 0. On the other hand, g3 is not monadically stable since player
1 deviates to g7 as a best response to the belief system in which player 2 wants to
deviate to g5 and player 3 to g6. Furthermore, g4 is monadically stable, but not
strongly stable. Indeed all players in the grand coalition N will re-conﬁgure the
network into g3. Finally, the complete network gN is also monadically stable, but not
strongly stable. In this case the coalition {2,3} wants to deviate to network g3 by
deleting their links with player 1. 
Next we return to the case of link-based network payoﬀs and show that the Network
Trust Equilibrium concept indeed achieves the desired objective. This is contrary
to the outcome achieved by the potential maximizer reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium
discussed in Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 4.7 If e ϕi(g) =
P
j∈Nd(i,g) φ(ij) is a link-based network payoﬀ function
founded on φ: gN → R+, then the monadically stable networks under two-sided link
formation costs are given by g = g?
φ ∪h, where g?
φ = {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) > max{cij,cji}}
and h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | φ(ij) = max{cij,cji}}.
Proof. Let ` ∈ Aa be a network trust equilibrium for the network payoﬀ function as
described in the assertion and let ga(`) be the resulting network.
From the deﬁnition of e ϕ it follows that e ϕj(ga(`) + ij) − cji = e ϕj(ga(`)) if and only if
φ(ij) = cji. Hence, `i?
ji = 1 if and only if φ(ij) = cji.
Furthermore, `ij = 1 is a best response to `i?
ji = 1 if and only if φ(ij) = cij. Moreover,
`ij = 0 is a best response to any value of `i?
ji if and only if φ(ij) 5 cij.
These facts imply that ij ∈ ga(`) if φ(ij) > cij as well as φ(ij) > cji, i.e., if φ(ij) >
27max{cij,cji}. Also, if φ(ij) = max{cij,cji} — implying that φ(ij) = cij or φ(ij) = cji
— the link ij might be present in ga(`) or not. This proves the assertion of the
proposition.
We now provide some intuition as to why the network trust equilibrium performs
well in the above example while the potential maximizer does not. The potential
expresses the change in payoﬀs from unilateral deviations by using the same function
for all players, and the potential maximizer achieves the maximum for this function.
Now, under individual stability, a player loses the costs incurred in trying to form
the link, if the other player refuses to form the link. Hence, when considering the
formation of a link, a player will only initiate a link if its beneﬁts exceed the sum
of costs incurred by both players since that guarantees participation of both players
in the formation process. As already shown in the previous section, this makes the
potential maximizer an unappealing reﬁnement. Under monadic stability however,
players correctly anticipate the responses of their partners when initiating a link.
Consequently player i initiates a link with j only if it exceeds j’s net beneﬁt. Hence,
the NTE selects networks that will be formed when the beneﬁt of a link is at least as
much as the maximum link costs for the pair of players involved.
4.2 One-sided link formation costs
Next we address the introduction of myopic trust in the model with one-sided link
formation costs. Surprisingly the results are very diﬀerent from the ones obtained
for two-sided link formation costs. The presence of one-sided link formation costs
leads to the persistence of coordination failures, in particular because players trust
the other players to do the myopically rational thing.
Consider the standard model with one-sided link formation costs (Ab,πb). The
analogue of Deﬁnition 4.1 is now as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.8 Let (`,r) ∈ Ab be an arbitrary action tuple. For every player i ∈ N
we deﬁne his myopic belief system (`i?,ri?) ∈ Ab based on (`,r) by
(i) For every j 6= i we deﬁne
• `i?
ji = ri?
ji = 0 if ϕj(g(`) + ij) < ϕj(g(`)),
• `i?
ji = 0 and ri?
ji = 1 if ϕj(g(`)+ij)−cji < ϕj(g(`)) 5 ϕj(g(`)+ij), and
28• `i?
ji = ri?
ji = 1 if ϕj(g(`) + ij) − cji = ϕj(g(`)),
(ii) and for all j,k ∈ N with j 6= i and k 6= i we deﬁne `i?
jk = `jk and ri?
jk = rjk.
An action tuple (ˆ `, ˆ r) ∈ Ab is a Network Trust Equilibrium under one-sided
link formation costs if for every player i ∈ N: (ˆ `i, ˆ ri) ∈ Ab
i is a best response to
(ˆ `i?
−i, ˆ ri?
i ) ∈ Ab
−i for the payoﬀ function πb.
A network g is now called monadically stable under one-sided link formation costs if
there exists a Network Trust Equilibrium (ˆ `, ˆ r) ∈ Ab in (Ab,πb) such that g = gb(ˆ `, ˆ r).
From the deﬁnition of the myopic belief system under one-sided link formation
costs, it is clear that if both `i?
ji = ri?




ij = 1, coordination problems
can arise quite easily. Indeed if both cij > 0 and cji > 0, then in their best response
both players i and j will consent to forming a new link, but will be unwilling to pay
for it. This is a classic coordination problem since both players rationally believe
that the other player will bear the link formation costs. Hence, the most proﬁtable
links might not be formed in the Network Trust Equilibrium under one-sided link
formation costs.
The following proposition summarizes this particular weakness of our concept of
myopic trust with one-sided link formation costs. It discusses the monadically stable
networks for link-based network payoﬀs.
Proposition 4.9 If e ϕi(g) =
P
j∈Nd(i,g) φ(ij) is a link-based network payoﬀ function
founded on φ: gN → R+, then the monadically stable networks under one-sided link
formation costs are given by g = gmm ∪ h with
gmm = {ij ∈ gN | min{cij,cji} < φ(ij) < max{cij,cji}}
and
h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | min{cij,cji} = 0 and φ(ij) = max{cij,cji}}.
Proof. Let (`,r) ∈ Ab be an arbitrary action tuple. Then for every j 6= i we have
(i) `i?
ji = ri?
ji = 0 if φ(ij) < 0,
(ii) `i?
ji = 0 and ri?
ji = 1 if 0 5 φ(ij) < cji, and
(iii) `i?
ji = ri?
ji = 1 if φ(ij) = cji.
29The ﬁrst case is impossible since φ(ij) = 0 for all ij ∈ gN.
From the second case it immediately follows that ij is formed through the best re-
sponse structure to (`?,r?) if φ(ij) < max{cij,cji} as well as φ(ij) > min{cij,cji}.
Hence, all links in gmm are formed.
However, from the third case it follows that ij is not formed through the best re-
sponse structure (due to coordination failure) if φ(ij) = max{cij,cji}, cij > 0 as well
as cji > 0.
Finally, suppose φ(ij) = max{cij,cji} and min{cij,cji} = 0. Without loss of gener-





ij = 1 as well as (`i
ij = 0 and ri
ij = 1). This implies that ij might be
formed (if `i
ij = 1) or it might not be formed (if `i
ij = 0). This is formulated through
the h-part given in the assertion.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we study the standard model of network formation where agents can
establish costly links only with the consent of the other agent. The payoﬀ function
is kept as general as possible and a natural stability concept called strong pairwise
stability has been introduced. Additionally, a simple form of trust is incorporated in
network formation through the notion of a network trust equilibrium.
We ﬁnd that results from the two sided link formation cost model diﬀer substan-
tially from those obtained under one-sided link formation costs. On the one hand,
in general, all equilibria of the two-sided model are also equilibria in the one-sided
model. On the other hand, however, our example of the link-based model (Proposi-
tions 3.6, 3.11, 4.7 and 4.9) in which all beneﬁts are derived only from direct links,
provides interesting additional insights. Under two-sided costs we ﬁnd that the po-
tential maximizer is not a useful solution concept since it takes into account costs of
pair of agents in a link, while considering individual actions. Yet for one-sided costs
the potential maximizer is able to select the right Nash equilibria since it takes into
account the actions and costs of individual players.
Furthermore, the network trust equilibrium concept, where these actions are cor-
rectly anticipated through the beliefs of the agents, performs very well for the two-
sided model. Interestingly, however, this equilibrium concept does not prove to be
very helpful in the context of one-sided link formation costs. We ﬁnd that although
30agents may correctly anticipate those who will accept proposals to form links, there
emerge situations with severe coordination failure. Recall that only direct links are
beneﬁcial in this link-based model. Consequently, each agent expects the other agent
to initiate the link, and this can prevent the formation of networks. Incorporat-
ing higher orders of trust in the beliefs as suggested in Gilles and Sarangi [11] or
heterogeneity in the model can help in circumventing these coordination problems.
6 Proofs of the main results
6.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
If. Suppose that g ⊂ gN is strong deletion proof with respect to the given payoﬀ
function ϕa. Deﬁne `g ∈ Aa by `
g
ij = 1 if and only if ij ∈ g. Now ga(`g) = g. We now

















Let li 6= `
g
i and deﬁne hi = {ij ∈ gN | `
g
ij = 1 and lij = 0}. Then it follows that
hi = {ij ∈ g | lij = 0} and ga(li,`
g
−i) = g \ hi. From this, equation (7), and strong












Only if. Suppose that g is individually stable. Then, with the deﬁnitions above, `g
is a Nash equilibrium in (Aa,πa). Let M ⊂ Nd(i,g) and let hM = {ij ∈ g | j ∈ M}




1 if ij ∈ g \ hM;
0 otherwise.

















From this it can be concluded that g is indeed strong link deletion proof.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
316.2 Proof of Theorem 3.8
Let b ` ∈ Aa be a Nash equilibrium strategy tuple in the standard model with two-sided
link formation costs. We construct with b ` a strategy tuple in the standard model with
one-sided link formation generating exactly the same network ga(b `) and show that
this is a Nash equilibrium in that model.
First we remark that by the Nash equilibrium requirements on b ` without loss of
generality we may assume that for any ij ∈ gN either b `ij = b `ji = 1, or b `ij = b `ji = 0.
In the ﬁrst case we have that ij ∈ ga(b `) and in the second case we have that ij / ∈ ga(b `).
For b ` we deﬁne (`,r) ∈ Ab such that
(A) `ij = 1 and rij = 0 if and only if b `ij = b `ji = 1 and
• cij < cji, or
• cij = cji and i < j.
(B) `ij = 0 and rij = 1 if and only if b `ij = b `ji = 1 and
• cij > cji, or
• cij = cji and i > j.
(C) `ij = rij = 0 if and only if b `ij = b `ji = 0.
So, (`,r) ∈ Ab describes that the lowest link formation cost is paid for the formation
of every link ij ∈ ga(b `) = gb(`,r).
We now show that (`,r) is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the standard model with
one-sided link formation costs.
Let (Li,Ri) ∈ Ab
i be such that (Li,Ri) 6= (`i,ri). Now we deﬁne ˆ Lij = 1 if and only
if Lij = 1 or Rij = rij = 1. Otherwise ˆ Lij = 0.
Now it holds that ij ∈ ga(b `−i, ˆ Li) if and only if b `ij = ˆ Lij = 1 if and only if
1. `ij = Lij = 1,
2. rji = Lij = 1, or
3. rij = Rij = `ji = 1.
32Case 1 implies that ij / ∈ gb(`−i,r−i;Li,Ri), while cases 2 and 3 imply that ij ∈
gb(`−i,r−i;Li.Ri). This in turn implies — together with the construction that rij = 0
implies that `ji = 0 — that
g
b(`−i,r−i;Li,Ri) ⊂ g
a(b `−i, ˆ Li) ⊂ g
a(b `). (8)



























`ij · cij −
X
j6=i
rij · cij +
X
j6=i





`ij · cij = π
b
i(`,r),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Theorem 3.1 and (8). The second inequality
follows from the fact that
P
j6=i rij · cij =
P
j6=i Rij · rij · cij.
The above shows that (`,r) indeed is a Nash equilibrium with regard to the payoﬀ
function πb. Thus, ga(b `) is supported as a individually stable network in the standard
model with one-sided link formation costs.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.8.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3.9
Let g be a strong link deletion proof network under the net payoﬀ function ϕb.




ji = 1 if ij ∈ g




ji = 0 otherwise.
It is clear that (`g,rg) describes the cost minimizing link formation scheme that





















33Let (Li,Ri) ∈ Ab




i). We now deﬁne
M = {j ∈ N
d(i,g) | Lij = r
g
ij = 0} ∪ {j ∈ N
d(i,g) | Rij = `
g
ij = 0} 6= ∅.




−i;Li,Ri) = g \ hM.
From the properties of (`g,rg) and the above it follows that j ∈ Nd(i,g \ hM) if and
only if [Lij = `
g
ij = 1 and r
g
ij = 0] or [Rij = r
g
ij = 1 and `
g
ij = 0]. In the ﬁrst case
cij < cji and in the latter cij > cji.
From this it follows that
X
j∈Nd(i,g\hM)



















Lij · cij 5
5 ϕi(g \ hM) −
X
j∈Nd(i,g\hM)
Lij · cij 5











where the second inequality follows from (9) and the third inequality from the hy-
pothesis that g is strong link deletion proof with respect to ϕb.
Since this holds for all i ∈ N we conclude that (`g,rg) is indeed a Nash equilibrium
in (Ab,πb).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.9.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Suppose that ˆ ` ∈ Aa is an NTE under two-sided link formation costs. Let g = ga(ˆ `).
The proof now proceeds with two intermediate results.
Lemma 6.1 If cij > 0 and ˆ `i?
ji = 0 then ˆ `ij = 0.
Proof. Clearly, if ˆ `ij = 1 is selected, i incurs only costs cij > 0 and no beneﬁts. Since
ˆ ` is a best response to ˆ `?i, it therefore is concluded that ˆ `ij = 0.
34Lemma 6.2 If ˆ `
j?
ij = 0 then ˆ `ij = 0.
Proof. Note that ˆ `
j?
ij = 0 means that ϕi(ga(`) + ij) − cij < ϕi(ga(`)).
Thus, irrespective of whether ˆ `i?
ji = 0 or ˆ `i?
ji = 1, player i has a net gain of
ϕi(g
a(`)) − ϕi(g
a(`) + ij) + cij > 0
by selecting ˆ `ij = 0. This implies that indeed ˆ `ij = 0 is a best response.
From Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 it now follows immediately that
Corollary 6.3 If cij > 0 and ˆ `ij = 1, then ˆ `
j?
ij = ˆ `i?
ji = 1.
We proceed the proof of Theorem 4.2 with the assumption that cij > 0. The case of
cij = 0 requires only a simple modiﬁcation of the arguments that follow below.
From Corollary 6.3 it can be derived that g = ga(ˆ `) = ga(ˆ `i, ˆ `i?
−i). Hence, we conclude
from this that
π




a(ˆ `i, ˆ `
i?
−i).
We proceed the proof of Theorem 4.2 in two steps: First we show that g is strong
link deletion proof. Subsequently we show that g is pairwise stable.











a(ˆ `i, ˆ `
i?
−i) \ hM = g




i (ˆ `i, ˆ `
i?
−i) = ϕi(g \ hM) −
X
j6=i
Lij · cij = ϕ
a
i(g \ hM) 5 π
a
i (ˆ `) = ϕ
a
i(g).
This indeed shows that g is strong link deletion proof.
Next we show that g is pairwise stable for the net payoﬀ function ϕa by conﬁrming
that adding a link ij 6∈ g is not beneﬁcial for either i or j or both given the payoﬀ
35function ϕa.
Suppose that adding the link ij 6∈ g is beneﬁcial for player i under ϕa, i.e.,
ϕ
a
i(g + ij) = ϕi(g + ij) −
X
ih∈g
cih − cij > ϕ
a




Then it follows that ϕi(g) − cij > ϕi(g). This in turn implies the following:
1. Firstly, this implies that ˆ `
j?
ij = 1.
2. Secondly, from the previous combined with the hypothesis that ˆ ` is an NTE,
it follows that ˆ `i?
ji = 0. Namely, if ˆ `i?
ji = 1, since adding the link ij is strictly
beneﬁcial for player i, it should be that ˆ `ij = 1, since that would then be the
best response to ˆ `i?
ji = 1.
3. Finally, Since ˆ `j is a best response to ˆ `
j?
−j and ij 6∈ g = ga(ˆ `), it has to follow
that ˆ `ji = 0.
From these conclusions — in particular the second conclusion — we arrive at:
ϕj(g + ij) − cji < ϕj(g) or ϕ
a
j(g + ij) < ϕ
a
j(g).
This in turn implies that g is indeed pairwise stable.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
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